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Nonjudicial Disposition Under Louisiana Commercial Law
Chapter Nine
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Law,' effective January 1,
1990, regulates the creation and effects of security interests in most
movables, supplanting the law of pledge and chattel mortgage. Included
in Chapter 9 are provisions which allow the creditor to dispose of the
collateral nonjudicially in enforcement of all security interests. This lack
of restriction on the availability of nonjudicial disposition is new in
Louisiana. This comment will provide an overview of the Chapter's
sections regulating these nonjudicial dispositions. More detailed discus-
sion is included concerning a few areas of interest in which current and
prior Louisiana law may be helpful in predicting how the new procedure
will be applied and interpreted. 2
POSSESSION OF THE COLLATERAL
Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-503
Upon default U.C.C. section 9-503 allows the secured party, unless
otherwise agreed, to take possession of the collateral in enforcement of
his security agreement.' The secured party is not required to utilize
judicial process, 4 and as default is the only prerequisite listed in U.C.C.
section 9-503, generally no notice to the debtor is required in utilizing
this "self-help" repossession right.5 As an alternative to self-help, the
secured party may proceed by judicial action, 6 in accord with U.C.C.
section 9-501. The secured party may also render the collateral unusable,
or proceed with the sale of the collateral on the debtor's premises.7 In
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Reference to the Uniform Act will be made as "U.C.C." or "Uniform Commercial
Code." Reference to the Chapter as adopted in Louisiana will be made as "Chapter 9"
or "Louisiana section 9-50x."
2. For an overview of all of the provisions of Chapter 9 as enacted in Louisiana,
see Harrell, A Guide to the Provisions of Chapter Nine of Louisiana's Commercial Code,
50 La. L. Rev. 711 (1990). For a detailed look at Chapter 9 and comparison to the
Uniform Act, see W. Hawkland, Hawkland's Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana Com-
mercial Law (1990).
3. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977).
4. Id.
5. W. Hawkland, R. Lord & C. Lewis, U.C.C. Series § 9-503:02 (Art 9) (1986).
6. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977).
7. Id.
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utilizing his right to self-help repossession, the secured party is not
allowed to breach the peace in taking possession;' the consequences of
which are possible liability for damages and/or conversion. The line
between what is and what is not a breach of the peace has sometimes
been difficult for the courts to draw. Generally, any form of protest
to the repossession by the debtor or entering of closed premises by the
secured party will result in a breach of the peace.9
Louisiana Section 9-503
Because of Louisiana's traditional civil law hostility to self-help in
all areas of the law, Louisiana section 9-503 does not adopt the U.C.C.
Article 9 repossession approach, but does attempt to incorporate the
inherent efficiencies of that approach.' 0 Louisiana section 9-503 allows
the secured party to sell, following the provisions of Louisiana section
9-504, collateral in his possession." The secured party can acquire pos-
session either before or after default, and either through pledge or
voluntary surrender of the collateral by the debtor.' 2 Incorporeals can
be sold without delivery in Louisiana,' 3 and thus need not be in the
possession of the secured party in order to be sold by the secured
party.' 4 The secured party has the right to use summary process to
obtain the documents, instruments, or endorsements necessary for pro-
ceeding with disposal of the incorporeals.1' Once the secured party is
in possession, he proceeds in generally the same manner as secured
parties in the other forty-nine states. Louisiana does not provide for
the disabling of the collateral, or disposal of the collateral still on the
debtor's premises, as is provided in the U.C.C. Article 9.
Policy Behind Louisiana's Version of Section 9-503
The civil law bias against self-help is based on a strong policy of
keeping the peace. In Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Com-
pany,16 Justice Tate, in expressing the policy behind the law according
possessory protection to a possessor evicted by force or fraud no matter
how short the duration of possession stated, "[tihis is done in the
8. Id.
9. W. Hawkland, R. Lord & C. Lewis, U.C.C. Series § 9-503:03 (Art 9) (1986).
10. W. Hawkland, Hawkland's Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana Commercial Law
§ 5.03 (1990) [hereinafter Hawkland's Handbook].
11. La. R.S. 10:9-503(1) (Supp. 1990).
12. La. R.S. 10:9-503(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2481.
14. La. R.S. 10:9-503(1)(b) (Supp. 1990).
15. La. R.S. 10:9-503(2) (Supp. 1990).
16. 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring in denial of reh'g).
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interest of preservation of peace in society and as a deterrent against
self-help.' ' 7 In Ryder v. Lacour,8 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal, in a property dispute involving inconclusive attempts by both
parties to establish possession, declined to give legal effect to the last
of these corporeal acts of possession, stating that "[tihis would encourage
physical confrontations and elevate self help to a status never enjoyed
in a civilian jurisdiction."'' 9 The third circuit also expressed this policy
in another instance, "[sielf-help is generally frowned upon by our courts
and is inimical to public order.' '20 Louisiana courts have enforced this
policy against self-help in various other types of legal situations.2'
Based on this policy against self-help, creditors in Louisiana have
had to resort to judicial process in obtaining possession of collateral
from debtors upon default, unless the debtor consents to the creditor
taking possession. For instance in Grandeson v. International Harvester
Credit Corp.,22 the creditor repossessed a refrigerator sold to the debtor,
supposedly on the authority of a repossession agreement signed with
the debtor and the consent of the debtor's wife. The court found the
repossession agreement to be ineffective and that, due to the head and
master rule in effect at the time, the wife's consent in the husband's
absence was also ineffective. The court stated the applicable rule of law
as, "[t]his refrigerator was repossessed without resorting to judicial
proceedings and in order to avoid the result of legal liability, it must
be shown that the plaintiff [debtor] consented to its removal, either
orally or in writing.' '23
The common law courts have developed a similar rule in cases
involving the U.C.C.'s prohibition on breach of the peace by the seizing
creditor. In one of the more difficult areas in the interpretation of that
prohibition, several courts have held that deception of the debtor by
17. Id. at 781.
18. 322 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
19. Id. at 246.
20. Guidry v. Rubin, 425 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
21. Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d 317
(1953) (no right to self-help repossession by chattel mortgagee's assignee absent consent
by the mortgagor); Ogden v. John Jay Esthetic Salons, Inc., 470 So. 2d 521 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1985) (no right to self-help retaking of possession by lessor where lessor is not
justified in believing premises to be abandoned by lessee); Central Fidelity Bank v. Gray,
422 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (no right to repossession of an automobile by
a bank as lienholder even from a possessor who may not have been the owner); Martinez
v. Therma-King Sales and Service Division of Transport Refrigeration of La. Inc., 346
So. 2d 798, 800-01 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 349 So. 2d 884 (La. 1977) (no right
to self-help repossession in enforcement of a repairman's privilege); Vercher v. Toda
Enterprises, Inc., 216 So. 2d 318, 319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (no right to self-help
repossession by a seller absent consent of the buyer).
22. 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d 317 (1953).
23. Id. at 506, 66 So. 2d at 318.
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the secured party in order to obtain possession violates the intent of
the rule.2 4 In Ford Motor Credit Company v. Byrd'2 the debtor prevailed
in an action for conversion based on a breach of the peace claim against
the creditor. Ford Motor Credit was assigned the retail installment
contract on a sale of an automobile to the debtor. The parties disagreed
as to whether the debtor's payments were in arrears at the time of the
repossession, but neither disputed that the debtor was contacted and
asked to drive to the dealer in order to discuss his account. While the
debtor was inside, his vehicle was removed from the parking lot and
placed in a storage area. The jury concluded that the automobile was
obtained without the debtor's consent or knowledge, and on appeal the
Alabama Supreme Court held that this supported the debtor's claim of
conversion. The supreme court emphasized the debtor's protest against
the repossession, which should have forced the secured party to use
process. The court stated:
We cannot interpret § 9-503 to permit obtaining possession
through trick, without knowledge upon the part of the debtor.
To interpret § 9-503 to allow repossession in these circumstances
would encourage practices abhorrent to society: fraud, trickery,
chicanery, and subterfuge, as alternatives to employment of
judicial processes that foster the concept of ours being a gov-
ernment of laws and not of men. If self-help erodes that concept
then self-help must be limited as we will limit it here.2 6
Thus, the common law jurisdictions applying the self-help repossession
provisions have expressed a rule very similar to Louisiana's rule, which
requires consent by the debtor to the creditor's taking possession.
With the limitations on the self-help repossession right provided in
the U.C.C., there are very few situations in which the U.C.C. self-help
repossession right differs practically from the Louisiana ban on self-
help repossession. The most common of these situations occurs when
the collateral is in a non-enclosed area and the debtor does not know
that the secured party is repossessing, in which case self-help repossession
under the U.C.C. is proper as no breach of the peace occurs. The other
way that Louisiana section 9-503 differs from U.C.C. section 9-503 is
when the collateral is an incorporeal, in that Louisiana expressly allows
the secured party to sell the incorporeals without possession, consistent
with Louisiana law, and the U.C.C. does not.
24. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Byrd, 351 So. 2d 557 (Ala. 1977); Quest v.
Barnett Bank of Pensacola, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Lane v.
John Deere Company, 767 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. 1989). But see Speigle v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 56 Ala. App. 469, 473-74, 323 So. 2d 360, 362-63 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert.
denied, 295 Ala. 420, 323 So. 2d 367 (1975); Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., 158 W.
Va. 685, 213 S.E.2d 475, 478-80 (1975).
25. 351 So. 2d 557 (Ala. 1977).
26. Id. at 559.
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RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE COLLATERAL
U.C.C. and Louisiana Section 9-504(1) and (2)
After default, the secured party has the right to sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the collateral.17 Louisiana section 9-503 adds the
prerequisite that the secured party must be in possession of the collateral
in order to proceed under section 9-504,28 unless the collateral is an
incorporeal. 29 Although the courts have not often decided the meaning
of the term "otherwise dispose," 30 they have provided some indication
of what it is not. In Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc.," the court
decided that appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy in order to continue
the debtor's business before liquidation was not a disposition within the
meaning of the term "otherwise dispose." In Cordova v. Lee Galles
Oldsmobile12 the court held that a loan of a repossessed vehicle to
police for use in undercover operations was likewise not a disposition
within the meaning of the term "otherwise dispose." It has been sug-
gested that the drafters intended a lack of restriction on the secured
party and that the term ought to be interpreted to allow the secured
party to best realize on the collateral, including using or operating the
collateral or the carrying on of the debtor's business by the secured
party."
In Louisiana, should the secured party decide to lease the collateral,
it is clear that he will have the obligations of a lessor to his lessee.34
Although the secured party can lease the property owned by the debtor,
he is limited to leasing it for its usual use." In addition to the usual
obligations of the lessor, the secured party also warrants his lessee's
enjoyment of the property from claims by the debtor.36
Distribution of the Proceeds of the Disposition
U.C.C. and Louisiana Section 9-504(2)
After the disposition, section 9-504 provides for the distribution of
the proceeds. There is little difference in the provisions of the U.C.C.
27. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1977); La. R.S. 10:9-504(1) (Supp. 1990).
28. La. R.S. 10:9-503(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
29. La. R.S. 10:9-503(l)(b) (Supp. 1990).
30. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:05, at 13.
31. 796 F.2d 1293, 1297 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986).
32. 100 N.M. 204, .668 P.2d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
33. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:05, at 13.
34. Id. at 14.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 2681.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2682.
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and Louisiana Chapter 9 on this matter. First, the expenses of the sale
are paid. Second, the indebtedness covered by the security agreement is
satisfied. Third, subordinate security interests in the collateral are sat-
isfied. Finally, the secured party may be responsible for a surplus, or
the debtor may be responsible for a deficiency.
First, the reasonable expenses of the disposition, retaking, holding,
sale or lease preparation, and legal expenses and attorney fees if provided
for in the security agreement and not prohibited by law are deducted
from the sale proceeds.17 Regarding the matter of whether attorney fees
are prohibited by law, Louisiana Civil Code article 2000 provides in
pertinent part "[i]f the parties, by written contract, have expressly agreed
that the obligor shall ... be liable for the obligee's attorney fees in a
fixed or determinable amount, the obligee is entitled to that amount." 38
In Central Progressive Bank v. Bradley,39 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that article 2000 will not be enforced by the courts when the
attorney fees fixed in the contract are excessive and unreasonable, and
the courts have authority to inquire into the reasonableness of the fee.
The court in Central cited its decision in Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogerse
in which the court quoted Code of Professional Responsibility Disci-
plinary Rule 2-106,41 which prohibits excessive attorney fees and provides
a list of factors to use in determining whether a fee is excessive.
Second, the debt secured by the security agreement is satisfied from
the proceeds of the disposition. 42 One should note that cross-collater-
alization is still possible under section 9-504(1)(b). 43 Senior security in-
terests are not discharged or satisfied in the disposition under the section
9-504 procedure; the purchaser acquires subject to any senior security
interest. This procedure differs from the Louisiana procedure governing
judicial sales, which provides that if the price offered by the highest
bidder is insufficient to discharge the senior interests, the property will
not be sold." Also, the Louisiana judicial sales procedure provides that
the purchaser will only pay to the sheriff that part of the purchase price
exceeding the amount of the senior interest. 45 The amount of the senior
37. La. R.S. 10:9-504(l)(a) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(a) (1977).
38. La. Civ. Code art. 2000.
39. 502 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1987).
40. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
41. The Code of Professional Responsibility has since been replaced by the Rules of
Professional Conduct. The provision discussed is now found at La. R.S. Title 37, art.
16, Rule 1.5 (a-d).
42. La. R.S. 10:9-504(1)(b) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(b) (1977).
43. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:08, at 26.
44. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2337.
45. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2374.
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interest is owed to the senior creditor by the purchaser, thus this amount
is withheld from the amount paid to the sheriff. Little practical difference
exists here between these two procedures, however, as it would be
commercially unreasonable for a subordinate security interest holder to
sell the collateral for a total price less than the senior indebtedness, as
he would be receiving no value towards the reduction of the debt he
is owed. In other words, no sale can occur under either Chapter 9 or
the Louisiana procedure for judicial sales unless the buyer agrees that
the collateral is worth more than the senior security interest's debt
amount. It should also be noted that the subordinate security interest
proceeding under section 9-504 is likely to activate default clauses in
the senior security agreement," further reducing the practical 'effect of
any procedural differences in this area.
Third,, subordinate interests are satisfied if written demand is received
from these creditors before distribution of the proceeds is complete. 41
The secured party disposing of the collateral is allowed to request proof
of the subordinate security interest's validity, and failure by the sub-
ordinate interest holder to provide this proof relieves the disposing
secured party from his duty to comply with the demand for paymenta.4
This provision is necessary as the disposing creditor can be liable to
the debtor for paying a bad claim, but he is also required by the law
to pay valid subordinate claims.
A related problem exists when more than one subordinate interest
holder makes a claim. The secured party is faced with the difficult task
of determining the priority, in addition to the validity, of the competing
claims. The Louisiana procedural rules governing concursus proceedings49
should be applied to provide the secured party protection in this situation.
In Asian International v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Etc. ,S the Code of
Civil Procedure rules governing concursus proceedings were applied to
Merrill Lynch holding an account claimed by two parties. The court
analyzed the purpose behind the concursus proceeding provision. "The
primary purpose of this remedial proceeding is to protect the stakeholder
from multiple liability, from conflicting claims, and from the vexation
attending involvement in multiple litigation in which the stakeholder may
have no direct interest."'" The court also observed that "[t]he articles
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure governing concursus suits are
to be construed liberally and given broad application.' '52 There is no
doubt that the secured party should have the benefit of the concursus
46. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:08, at 27-28.
47. La. R.S. 10:9-504(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(i)(c) (1977).
48. La. R.S. 10:9-504(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(c) (1977).
49. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4651-4662.
50. 435 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1067.
52. Id. at 1067.
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proceeding when confronted with two or more competing claims from
subordinate interests.
Finally, the debtor, unless otherwise agreed, is liable to the secured
party for any deficiency after the disposition, and is entitled to any
surplus." An exception to this provision exists if the underlying trans-
action is a sale of accounts or chattel paper, in which case the debtor
is neither liable for a deficiency nor entitled to a surplus, unless the
security agreement provides otherwise.5 4
THE DISPOSITION PROCEEDINGS
U.C.C. and Louisiana Section 9-504(3)
The U.C.C.'s only limitation on the conduct of the right of dis-
position by the secured party is that it must be done in a commercially
reasonable manner." Louisiana Chapter 9 adds an additional requirement
that the disposition be conducted in good faith.5 6' These requirements
apply to the manner, method, time, place, and terms of the disposition.57
The disposition can be at public or private proceedings, and as a unit
or in parcels.5" Louisiana Chapter 9 also states that the disposition can
be made with or without appraisal. 9 Both public and private proceedings
are nonjudicial in nature. Although the terms public and private are
not defined in the U.C.C. or Chapter 9, it is suggested that a public
sale is one in which the public is invited to attend and effective pub-
lication of when and where the sale is to occur is made. 60
Commercial reasonableness is likewise not defined by the U.C.C.,
and the definition of that term is of utmost importance as it is the
only limitation imposed on the process of disposition. "The draftsmen
felt that it would be unwise to try to place finite limits on the overriding
standard of fair play that was to circumscribe all dispositions by the
secured party under Chapter 9.'"6 Professor Hawkland suggests com-
mercial reasonableness is a general standard similar to the "reasonable
53. La. R.S. 10:9-504(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1977).
54. La. R.S. 10:9-504(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1977). For a discussion of
the potential difficulty in determining whether the underlying transaction is a sale or a
security interest, see W. Hawkland, R. Lord & C. Lewis, U.C.C. Series § 9-504:03 (Art.
9), at 585-86 (1986).
55. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977); La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
56. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
57. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977); La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
58. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977); La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
59. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
60. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:06, at 23.
61. Id. at 16.
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man" and "good faith" standards which pervade the Anglo-American
legal system. 62 More specifically, jurisprudence, U.C.C. section 9-507,
and the official Comments are to flesh out the standard.63 The case law
has generally suggested that the secured party must "use his best efforts
to see that the highest possible price is received for the collateral.""4
Prior to enactment of Chapter 9, Louisiana allowed nonjudicial
proceedings by a creditor in the pledge relationship. The pledger/debtor
was allowed to authorize a sale or other disposition of movable property
without the intervention of the courts.65 The jurisprudence establishing
the standards imposed on the pledgee/creditor actions in these nonjudicial
dispositions in the pledge context may indicate how the courts will define
commercial reasonableness in Louisiana under Chapter 9.
Elmer v. Elme& is an excellent example of a court reviewing the
actions of a creditor in a nonjudicial sale. The debtor borrowed $70,000
from the creditor secured by 700 shares of stock in the Elmer Candy
Corporation. The promissory note evidencing the debt stated that upon
non-payment of the note the creditor was authorized to sell the stock
"at public or private sale without recourse to judicial proceedings, and
without either demand, appraisement, advertisement or notice of any
kind.''67 The creditor was also authorized to purchase the shares himself
at a public or private sale, or to acquire the shares himself at market
value.
The debtor did not pay the first installment, and the creditor pro-
ceeded to acquire the collateral, refusing the debtor's attempts to obtain
an extension. The creditor, the president of Elmer Candy, and the
creditor's attorney met at the attorney's office. The president informed
the attorney of the book value of the shares,68 and the creditor gave
the attorney a signed document instructing the attorney to acquire the
shares. An attempt to notify the debtor's attorney was unsuccessful.
The attorney prepared three documents, including a letter of notice to
the debtor, which were signed by the three parties present and the wife
of the president. These actions constituted the sale of the stock to the
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id. at 16.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 3165.
66. 203 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
67. Id. at 394.
68. The president gave a per share book value of $100 to $110. Testimony at the
trial by a Hibernia National Bank officer gave a loan value of $154 per share. Review
of the books of the Elmer Candy Company at the end of the fiscal year ended 3 weeks
prior to the "sale" revealed a $126 per share value. As the company was closely held,
unlisted, and untraded, a "market value" as referred to in the pledge agreement was
indeterminable. 203 So. 2d at 396.
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creditor. The debtor then filed suit seeking to set aside the sale, and
seeking return of the pledged stock upon his payment of the amount
of the loan.
The court stated the standard to be applied in this situation as
follows:
A mere literal compliance with the terms of the pledge is not
in itself sufficient to render valid the sale and purchase by the
pledgee of the subject of the pledge, since the pledgee occupies
a fiduciary relation to the pledgor, being regarded as a trustee
or agent of the pledgor in making the sale, owing the pledgor
the duty of acting fairly and in good faith.6 9
The pledgee must attempt to realize the amount of the debt by the sale.
He must not merely attempt to acquire title to the property at the
lowest possible price.7 0
In its review of the facts, the fourth circuit found "an utter disregard
by the pledgee of the rights of the pledgor."17 The creditor's motivation
was solely the acquisition of the stock, which he expressed even before
the first installment was due, and he also testified to that effect. 72 The
court found the sale amounted to no more than an appropriation of
the stock by the pledgee and set aside the sale.
A similar conclusion was reached in the earlier case of Dibert v.
Wernicke,73 a case decided by the United States Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals applying Louisiana pledge law. The pledge agreement authorized
the creditor to nonjudicially sell the pledged bonds similar to the agree-
ment in Elmer, specifically providing, "If said sale or sales shall be
public or at any broker's board or stock exchange * * * [the creditor]
*** may purchase said property. ' ' 74 After maturity of the note secured
and some negotiation with the debtor, the creditor proceeded to sell the
bonds on the New Orleans Stock Exchange. No notice of the sale was
given to the debtor or its sureties, no advertisement or posting of notice
of the sale was made, and the broker provided very little information
concerning the bonds to those present at the time of the sale. All of
these practices conformed with the customary manner of doing business
on the exchange. The creditor then bid two cents on the dollar for the
bonds, no higher bid was made, and the "sale" was complete.
The court found literal compliance with the terms of the pledge
agreement was not enough. Reasonable care and due diligence in securing
69. Id. at 394.
70. Id. at 395.
71. Id. at 396.
72. Id. at 396-97.
73. 214 F. 673 (6th Cir. 1914).
74. Id. at 675.
1262 [Vol. 51
COMMENTS
a just price, taking into account both the creditor's and the debtor's
interest, were to be exercised by the creditor.
In other words, it was the duty of the [creditor], in selling the
bonds as pledgee, to conduct the sale in a fair and diligent
manner, tending to secure a reasonable price for the bonds for
the benefit of all concerned, and not in such manner as to
enable it, under color of a sale, to purchase the bonds at a
sacrifice; it was a "trustee to sell," not to buy, though with
the privilege of buying, if fairly sold. 75
The court found the creditor's motive to be acquiring ownership of
the bonds. Even though the sale was technically conducted within the
creditor's authority, and within the custom of the Stock Exchange, the
unfair use of the authority and the resulting grossly inadequate price
made the sale invalid.
Although these cases involve situations in which the creditor acquired
the pledged property, the fiduciary duty imposed upon the creditor
applies in any disposition by the pledgee. The analogy to the creditor
under Louisiana Chapter 9 is an easy one. In both instances the creditor
is in possession of the debtor's property and is attempting to dispose
of collateral in order to realize on the credit extended to the debtor.
It is plausible that courts in Chapter 9 disposition situations will find
a fiduciary duty owed by the creditor to the debtor, since the creditor
is selling the debtor's property both for the debtor's and the creditor's
benefit, in establishing what commercial reasonableness means under
Chapter 9.
Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act
Another body of Louisiana law may prove helpful in fleshing out
the commercial reasonableness standard to be applied under Chapter 9.
The Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act76 provides procedures to be
followed in judicial sales in order for the mortgagee or creditor to be
entitled to a deficiency judgment after the sale if the sales proceeds are
insufficient to satisfy the debt. The Act was passed in 1934 to address
the prevalent practice of including waiver of appraisement clauses in
mortgages. 77 As the mortgagee can bid up to the full mortgage indebt-
edness amount without incurring any cash outlay other than a minor
sales commission and fees, in times of depressed economic values other
bidders are discouraged from bidding and the mortgagee can acquire
75. Id. at 681.
76. La. R.S. 13:4106-4108.3 (1968 and Supp. 1990).
77. McMahon, The Historical Development of Executory Procedure in Louisiana, 32
Tul. L. Rev. 555, 567 (1958).
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the property very cheaply. 7 The creditor would then be entitled to a
significant deficiency judgment against the debtor. The Act effectively
eliminated these waivers by protecting the debtor with strict procedural
requirements imposed on the sale, and failure of the mortgagee to comply
with the procedures defeated the mortgagee's right to a deficiency judg-
ment. 79 The Act attempted to assure proper appraisal of the debtor's
property, making the deficiency judgment a true representation of the
difference in the market value of the property and the value of the
debt .8o
There are both legislative and scholarly expressions to the effect
that the strict procedural requirements of the Deficiency Judgment Act
will not apply to dispositions under Chapter 9. 1989 Louisiana Act
Number 137 section 881 amended the Deficiency Judgment Act, adding
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4108.3 which provides:
The rights or absence thereof of a secured creditor to pursue
and collect a deficiency from a debtor, guarantor, or surety in
connection with a secured transaction subject to Chapter 9 of
the Louisiana Commercial Laws (R.S. 10:9-101, et seq.) shall
be exclusively subject to the provisions of Chapter 9.82
Again, the only express protection for the debtor in Chapter 9 is the
requirement of conducting every aspect of the sale in a commercially
reasonable manner and in good faith.8 3 One should also note that Chapter
9 expressly states that the sale can be conducted with or without ap-
praisal, which is contrary to the Deficiency Judgment Act. 4
Professor Hawkland writes, "[tihe limitations imposed by the De-
ficiency Judgment Act are entirely eliminated when [a Chapter] 9 security
interest is foreclosed." 85 The debtor is protected by the commercial
reasonableness standard without need to resort to the formal require-
ments of the Deficiency Judgment Act, and new formal procedures need
not be imposed to replace those that have been "discredited and dis-
carded." 6 "[T]he idea is to see to it that the secured party does not
play fast and loose with the debtor's property when disposing of it at
a foreclosure sale." 87
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Comment, Deficiency Judgments in Louisiana, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1094, 1096 (1975).
81. 1989 La. Acts No. 137, § 8,
82. La. R.S. 13:4108.3 (Supp. 1990).
83. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990).
84. Id.
85. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:03, at 10.
86. Id. at 31.
87. Id. at 31.
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In spite of these express provisions and assertions to the contrary,
the Deficiency Judgment Act, or more specifically the jurisprudence
applying it, may still have relevance in dispositions under Chapter 9.
The policies underlying the Deficiency Judgment Act are sound, and
the Louisiana courts have been enforcing these policies in a diligent
manner for over five decades. Certainly some guidance as to how these
same courts will construe what is or is not commercially reasonable
conduct can be gleaned from a review of this jurisprudence.
Soon after enactment of the Deficiency Judgment Act, the courts
applied the Act to nonjudicial sales, even though the Act only expressly
covered judicial sales. In Home Finance Service v. Walmsley,88 the court
denied a creditor's action for a deficiency judgment after nonjudicial
sale without appraisal in enforcement of a chattel mortgage. After noting
that the Act specifically referred to judicial sales, the court stated:
we are of the opinion that the statement of the public policy
therein is sufficiently broad to disclose that it was the intention
of the lawmakers to place a stamp of disapproval on any practice
whereby encumbered property is sold without judicial appraise-
ment, and to sanction the type of agreement, such as the one
before us, would be to allow the employment of a device cal-
culated to defeat the underlying purposes which prompted the
passage of the law. 89
The Act was subsequently applied in the case of a nonjudicial sale
without appraisal to which the debtor had agreed.9 Even in an action
for a deficiency judgment in which the debtor failed to make an ap-
pearance, the court of appeal reversed the default judgment against the
debtor as the creditor failed to allege his nonjudicial sale was made
with appraisal.9' The court decided this even though there was an agree-
ment between the parties allowing the sale. 92 Clearly the courts did not
stay within the express provisions of the Act when strong public policy
supported decisions beyond those express provisions.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, 9 prohibited a deficiency judgment against
the debtor's surety, despite the surety's agreement not to be held to a
discharge of the debtor. The court concluded that allowing the judgment
against the surety would allow the surety to agree to something the
88. 176.So. 415 (La. App. Orl. 1937).
89. Id. at 417.
90. David Investment Company v. Wright, 89 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
91. Atlas Finance Corporation v. Whitehead, 99 So. 2d 481 (La. App. Orl. 1958).
92. Id.
93. 399 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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debtor could not have agreed to, circumventing the strong policy behind
the Act. The case is more interesting, however, for its insight into the
goal behind rigid enforcement of the Act. The court stated that the
reason for insisting on, appraisal is to insure the seeking of a price which
provides an acceptable measure for a deduction from the debt. 94 The
court believed that the legislature determined that sale without appraisal,
providing no acceptable measure to deduct from the debt, would be
treated as if the proceeds were sufficient to pay the entire debt. 95
The fourth circuit showed similar insight in an earlier case in which
the Deficiency Judgment Act was found not to apply. In International
City Bank & Trust Company v. Zander,96 the creditor sold pledged stock
on the New York Stock Exchange without appraisal pursuant to the
authorization in the pledge agreement. The court held that the creditor
was entitled to a deficiency judgment despite failing to follow the express
requirement of the Deficiency Judgment Act to obtain an appraisal. The
policy behind the Act would not be furthered by requiring appraisal
here, as an accurate market value could be easily obtained from reviewing
the stock listings in the newspaper. Thus, in a situation where the goal
of the Act, obtaining an accurate value with which to reduce the debt
after the sale, was obtained without resort to the strict procedures of
the Act, strict compliance with the Act was found unnecessary.
Even though the procedures required by the Deficiency Judgment
Act are inapplicable in enforcing a Chapter 9 security agreement, the
policies and goals of that Act can still guide the courts in their deter-
mination of a standard of commercial reasonableness. The creditor's
conduct should always be viewed with the objective of obtaining a fair
price for the debtor's property. This objective is especially vital in light
of the debtor's liability under section 9-504(2) for any deficiency of the
price obtained when applied against the debt. The Louisiana courts have
been enforcing this policy for over 50 years, and these courts have
displayed diligence in that enforcement. One has to wonder how much
these courts will actually adjust their decision-making process even with
the passage of Chapter 9.
Notice to the Debtor and Other Parties
The secured party also must reasonably notify the debtor of the
time and place of a public sale, or the time after which a private sale
will be made. 97 The debtor can waive or modify his right to notice after
94. Id. at 1287.
95. Id. at 1287.
96. 378 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
97. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977).
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default occurs. 98 No notice is necessary when the collateral is perishable,
rapidly depreciating, or customarily sold on a recognized market. 99 If
the collateral is not consumer goods, the secured party must notify
others with security interests in the collateral who have filed a financing
statement or whose written notice has been received by the secured
party. '
Right of the Secured Party to Buy
In a public sale, the secured party may purchase the collateral.' 0'
In a private sale, the secured party may not buy unless for a price
established in widely distributed price quotations or in a recognized
market.10 This differs from the prior law in Louisiana governing pledge
nonjudicial sales. The creditor and debtor were allowed to provide in
the pledge agreement that the creditor could acquire the collateral at
any type of nonjudicial sale, even without notice to the debtor.'03
RIGHTS AFTER Tm DisPosITIoN
U.C.C. and Louisiana Section 9-504(4)
The purchaser of the collateral receives all the rights of the debtor
in the collateral, with the security interest and the subordinate interests
discharged.' °4 The sale is good to that effect even if the secured party
fails to follow Part 5 of Chapter 9, if the buyer has no knowledge of
the defects and, in a public sale, there is no collusion.' 5 In a private
sale, lease, or other disposition, the buyer need only have acted in good
faith. 10
Right to Retain the Collateral in Satisfaction of the Debt
U.C.C. and Louisiana Section 9-505
Under section 9-505 the secured party can retain the collateral in
98. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977).
99. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977).
100. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977). The U.C.C. does
not provide for notice to those who have filed a financing statement.
101. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977).
102. La. R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977).
103. See, e.g., Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
104. La. R.S. 10:9-504(4) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1977).
105. La. R.S. I0:9-504(4)(a) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(a) (1977).
106. La. R.S. 10:9-504(4)(b) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(b) (1977).
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complete satisfaction of the debt. 0 7 This procedure is called strict fore-
closure by the U.C.C. The debtor is not liable for any deficiency or
costs, nor is he entitled to any surplus. 08 Strict foreclosure is not available
if sixty percent of the cash price or loan amount is paid on consumer
goods, but the debtor may renounce or modify this limitation after
default. ,09
The secured party can propose strict foreclosure after he, under the
provisions of section 9-503, is in possession." 0 Written notice of this
proposal must be sent to the debtor, unless the debtor has renounced
or modified his rights.' In the case of non-consumer goods under
Louisiana Chapter 9, notice must also be sent to other secured parties
holding security interests in the collateral who have filed financing
statements." 2 The parties entitled to receive notice are given twenty-one
days to respond, and if such party objects, the secured party must
proceed under 9-504."1 If no objection is received, the secured party
has acquired the collateral in satisfaction of the debt." 4
Louisiana adds two presumptions to the strict foreclosure scenario
not included in the U.C.C. Upon voluntary surrender or abandonment
of the collateral by the debtor upon default or in contemplation of
default, if the collateral is consumer goods, the surrender is presumed
to be for strict foreclosure unless the secured party notifies the debtor
within twenty days that he rejects the offer of strict foreclosure." 5 If
the collateral is not consumer goods, the surrender is presumed to be
for disposition pursuant to section 9-503 unless there is written agreement
contemporaneous to or after the surrender to the contrary." 6
It is worth noting that, under the law of pledge in Louisiana,
stipulations in the pledge agreement providing that the object of the
pledge becomes the property of the creditor upon default with no further
action on his part were prohibited. In fact, in Alcolea v. Smith' 7 the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the practice had been prohibited
for 1,400 years in civil law jurisdictions, since an edict of Constantine,"8
"and of which nothing better has since been said than that they were
107. La. R.S. 10:9-505 (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505 (1977).
108. Hawkland's Handbook, supra note 10, § 5:10, at 34.
109. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1977).
110. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1977).
111. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1977).
112. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990).
113. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1977).
114. La. R.S. 10:9-505(2) (Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1977).
115. La. R.S. 10:9-505(3) (Supp. 1990).
116. La. R.S. 10:9-505(4) (Supp. 1990).
117. 150 La. 482, 90 So. 769 (1922).
118. Id. at 488, 90 So. at 771.
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obnoxious to good morals, odious, oppressive, and unconscionable.", 9
The fourth circuit in Elmer basically decided that the creditor's actions
in that case amounted to an attempt at just such an appropriation. 20
There is dicta in Alcolea to the effect that the parties may agree after
the debt is due that the pledgee can retain the pledge in satisfaction of
the debt.1
21
Section 9-505 clearly contemplates this situation referred to in the
dicta in Alcolea. The secured party is only allowed to propose strict
foreclosure after default, and he must also get consent from the debtor,
in the form of no objection by the debtor, to be deemed to have
acquired the collateral. Secured parties should be wary of any action
on their part which has the appearance of bargaining for this sort of
consequence prior to default, due to the strong policy against it in the
pre-Chapter 9 Louisiana law, and the express terms of the Chapter
requiring the proposal to be after default.
CONCLUSION
The procedures by which the secured party enforces his security
agreement under Chapter 9 upon the default of the debtor are not
radically different from procedures which already existed in Louisiana
law. Under Chapter 9 the secured party needs the consent of the debtor
in order to obtain possession of the collateral, as was the case prior to
its enactment. Louisiana law allowed nonjudicial disposition by the
secured party if agreed to by the parties in a pledge agreement, and
now the law under Chapter 9 allows it in all security relationships
involving movables. Finally, under prior Louisiana practice the creditor
was allowed to keep the pledge in complete satisfaction of the debt if
the parties agreed after the debt came due, and this is substantially the
rule under Chapter 9 for all security interests involving movables. As
a result of these similarities, the prior Louisiana jurisprudence, and
especially the policies underlying it, can be very useful in applying
Chapter 9 in Louisiana.
Paul Joseph Ory
119. Id. at 490, 90 So. at 772.
120. Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So. 2d 391, 397 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
121. 150 La. at 492, 90 So. at 772.
1991] 1269

